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ABSTRACT 
During 2009, the Swedish Government is proposing to the Parliament that the last 
remaining monopoly of the national operator SJ – the commercial parts of rail 
passenger traffic – is removed in a step-wise process 2009-2010. This would 
introduce the possibility of on-the track competition for rail passenger services on 
all parts of the network. If so, it will mark the finalisation of a process that started 
in 1988 with the vertical separation of railway infrastructure from operations. 
The critical issue is how to legislate and regulate the new railway market that will 
emerge in 2010-2012. In this paper, we discuss the conditions for such a reform, 
looking at some critical issues such as the interface between subsidised (tendered) 
services and commercial services, the markets for rolling stock and vehicle 
maintenance, and the distribution of infrastructure capacity. The first aim of the 
paper is to recapitulate and analyze the increasing commitment to deregulation in 
the Swedish railway market. The second aim is to analyze the possible options 
that are at hand in dismantling SJ AB’s remaining monopoly rights to profitable 
railway lines in the inter-regional railway market and other potential sources of 
monopoly power. The third aim is to describe and analyze the transition from the 
multitude of market structures that exist today to an envisioned unified market 
structure after the reform. In addition, the sustainability of SJ’s financial 
performance in a changing market environment is reviewed, finding that the 
influence from general business cycles may be an important factor. The paper 
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also includes an overview of the experience from the previous regulatory reforms 
and recent changes in the competitive environment and supporting industries. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Swedish government is currently planning to go ahead with a step-wise nearly 
complete deregulation of the Swedish railway passenger industry (2009-2010, with full 
effect from 2012). If this takes place, it will mark the end of a process that started in 
1988 with the vertical separation of track infrastructure from operations, and the transfer 
of responsibility for the unprofitable local and regional railway lines to the County 
Public Transport Authorities. These two reforms made it possible to perform the first 
competitive tenders of passenger railway services in Sweden in 1989-1990. These 
tenders concerned local and regional lines, resulting in BK Tåg becoming the first new 
entrant to the railway industry in 1990. For the first time in over 40 years, the state-
owned incumbent Swedish State Railways (SJ) faced competition from another railway 
operator. Subsequently, more reforms followed that resulted in more competition in 
railway operations and a horizontal and vertical disintegration of the former monopolist 
SJ. 
A current critical question is how to legislate and regulate the new railway market that 
will emerge in 2010-2011. The paper has three aims. The first aim is to recapitulate and 
analyze the increasing commitment to deregulation in the Swedish railway market, in 
order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the current policy problems in 
the deregulation process. This leads us to the two other aims of this paper: to analyze 
two critical problems of the next steps of the deregulation process. The first problem is 
how to dismantle SJ Ltd’s remaining monopoly rights concerning the profitable inter-
railway lines and other potential sources of monopoly power. These railway lines are 
the Stockholm-Gothenburg line, the Stockholm-Skåne line, the Stockholm-Dalarna line, 
the Stockholm-Sundsvall line, the Stockholm-Karlstad line, and the Gothenburg-Malmö 
line. In addition, SJ Ltd effectively holds a monopoly in the profitable railway network 
in Mälardalen. However, the future of this monopoly is more uncertain as it exists due 
to agreements with the regional transport authorities. The other sources of monopoly 
power that have been pinpointed during the latest steps of the deregulation process are 
the control of the ticketing system and the modern train sets adapted to the Swedish 
railway system. The second problem is how to organise the transition from the 
multitude of market structures that exist today to an envisioned unified market structure 
after the reform. Currently, the Swedish railway passenger market consists of six major 
sub-markets: 
1. In some markets a monopoly firm decides on the number of trains and prices 
2. In some markets operators compete on the track 
3. In some markets regional transport authorities decides the prices of the tickets and 
the time tables and asks SJ to provide the services 
4. In the Mälardalen region the county transport authorities have made an agreement 
with SJ Ltd giving the railway operator a monopoly 
5. In some markets a national (Rikstrafiken) organises a competitive tenders of net 
contracts that includes both price aspects and quality aspects 
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6. In some markets regional transport authorities organise competitive tenders of 
(gross cost) contracts that includes both price aspects and quality aspects.2
 
 
As of today, no final model has been presented on tomorrow’s railway passenger 
system. However, drawing from a current government report regarding all public 
transport (SOU 2009:39), the most probable case is that there will be a step-wise 
selection process starting with firms making commitments on lines that they are willing 
to serve without a subsidy, followed by tenders in which firms place bids on lines and 
networks where subsidies are deemed necessary. Numerous problems are likely to occur 
in the transition process; for example existing contracts and other legally binding 
agreements that can decades to dissolve. 
DEREGULATING MARKETS FOR RAILWAY SERVICES – SOME 
THEORETICAL REMARKS 
The concept “deregulation” refers on the one hand to actions to privatise former state 
monopolies and/or to expose monopolies – formerly protected by legislation or other 
regulations – to competition, and on the other hand to the process that creates the new 
regulatory framework that will govern the deregulated market. The second aspect is 
often referred to as “regulatory reform”, because in many countries it is a prolonged and 
slow process to change the regulatory structures as old and often tacit regulations are 
replaced by new explicit regulations. The EU legislation in the railway sector is a good 
example of this, as no prior comprehensive pan-european railway regulation existed.  
In an interview in the Spanish daily news paper El País, Nobel laureate professor 
Amartya Sen remarked, when answering a question on the present economic crisis, that 
Adam Smith explained in detail how other motives than the search for profits are 
important for the functioning of a market economy. Smith emphasized the need for 
trust, generosity, compassion, public vocation and so on (El País, 2009, p. 22).  Swedish 
politicians and other policy makers taking part in the recent wave of deregulations seem 
to be in agreement with Smith. According to the Swedish politicians in power the 
deregulation of the railway system is deemed necessary to revitalise the public transport 
sector, to improve the quality of the services, to increase the efficiency of the system 
and to increase the number of passengers. All this will give a positive contribution to 
growth, employment, regional development, accessibility and environment (SOU 
2008:92, p. 322).  
Increased efficiency has been the principal driving force of the deregulation of the 
railway system in Sweden and in the EU. But there still exists a widespread disaccord 
among experts, politicians and other stakeholders on how the deregulated market should 
be organised. Some actors argue that a privatised monopoly will be the most efficient 
solution, other actors recommend competition in some markets to enhance the discipline 
of the public monopoly, other actors advocate competitive tenders or auctions to find 
the best operator of a railway line, and another group of actors suggest that operators 
can compete on the same track to provide the best service to society.  
                                                 
2 In addition to these sub-markets one can add the mixed contracts in which Rikstrafiken and one or several regional 
authorities share the revenue risk with the operator, and the railway services in southern Sweden, affecting also the 
Öresund bridge and Själland, where a recent competitive tender was organized jointly by Skånetrafiken and the 
Danish Trafikstyrelsen. 
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The Crumbling Defences of the “Natural” Monopoly Doctrine in the European 
Railway Market 
In the railway industry, presupposed scale economies in production, marketing, 
purchasing and co-ordination, and the mergers of smaller railways into bigger railways, 
for many decades implied that the provision of vertically integrated railway services 
was by definition viewed as a “natural” monopoly (see for example Beesley and 
Littlechild, 1992). Even Friedman (1972, p. 42), implicitly assumed that the railways 
were a natural monopoly when he wrote that a private monopoly of a technical 
monopoly, for example the railways, was better than a state monopoly or a regulation 
because a private firm will react faster to technical and societal change than regulated 
firms or public monopolies. Today, it is primarily the rail infrastructure that continues to 
be viewed as having characteristics of being a natural monopoly, forming the main  
argument for vertical separation of infrastructure from operations as applied in several 
European countries. However, we can note a persistent debate concerning the merits of 
vertical separation versus integration. Preston (1996) concluded that the economic 
evidence for vertical separation of railway firms is not fully convincing. He argued that 
there may for example be economies of scope related to vertically integrated planning 
of infrastructure and operations. Some researchers suggest that vertical separation 
should never have been applied at all because some scale economies in the European 
railway sector, which might have been possible to exploit before, are no longer 
available due to asset stripping and separation of previously integrated businesses and 
lines (see e.g. Bruzelius, 1998). As the deregulation process has advanced in Sweden, 
the Government’s appointed committees have gradually changed the position on scale 
economies. In the final report from Kommunikationskommittén it is argued that: ”For 
firms there are economies of scale up to a certain size of the firm. SJ has a size that is 
too small to fully exploit the economies of scale in both passenger and freight traffic” 
(SOU 1997:35), p. 162, our translation). The writers of the report also found that from a 
socio-economic point of view the most effective solution is that the monopolist operate 
the lines he find profitable and on all other lines other firms can be allowed to compete. 
The timing of the deregulation process on a European level has also been put forward as 
an argument against increased competition. In an article in the Swedish daily newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter (2007), the chairman of the board and the managing director of SJ Ltd 
argued against more competition in the Swedish railway system because some state 
owned companies (such as DSB and DB) seemed to use state subsidies to win contracts 
in Sweden. 
One of the cornerstones of the monopoly argument is the assumption that the costs of 
using the market will be significantly higher than using in-house production and 
planning when running a railway business. The costs to carry out transactions depend 
on the frequency of the transaction, uncertainty, the degree of specificity in the 
investments, and the perceived need to insure against opportunistic behaviour in 
markets with few actors. As can be understood from these factors, any change in a 
market structure may result in opposite forces as regards the transaction costs. When the 
former railway monopolies were dismantled in countries like Great Britain and Sweden, 
transactions that used to be managed internally were moved to a market with sellers and 
buyers. This type of shift has been interpreted in two contrasting ways by researchers. 
One group claims that the horizontal and vertical disintegration resulted in lower 
transaction costs because the transactions were made visible and exposed to market 
mechanisms. One of the architects behind the privatisation of British Rail claimed that 
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the separation of large vertically integrated firms into smaller specialised units lead to 
positive effects in terms of increased specialist knowledge of these firms (Foster, 1994). 
This division implied that a number of new contracts between the units had to be set up. 
Although the number of transactions in the system may have increased, the argument 
from this interpretation of transaction cost theory was that this does not necessarily 
imply higher transaction costs. In addition to the argument that transparency makes the 
transactions efficient, it has also been claimed that modern methods of management and 
control, auditing and computerisation decrease the costs of every transaction and make 
it easier to formulate the division of responsibility in contracts. Therefore, a clear 
separation of businesses into separate firms is necessary. 
It is important to note that one precondition of this line of reasoning is that the actors in 
the emerging markets should be exposed to market mechanisms, which do not appear 
automatically after a deregulation, and has even been neglected in some regulatory 
reforms aiming at disintegration. When splitting large railway companies into smaller 
units, some of them may become monopoly firms (such as providers of railway 
stations). Moreover, it can be argued that learning and efficiency gains are also linked to 
having several customers with partly different needs. If the companies of the new 
system are only serving the same divisions as before but now in the form of business 
firms the learning and efficiency gains from separation could turn out to be substantially 
smaller than what we expect in a competitive market. Another potential concern is that 
if the monopoly is broken up into many sub-markets for inputs as well as for operations, 
the post-deregulation industry may contain many firms operating in specialised markets 
which will result in increasing transaction costs. For example, the British railway 
industry was broken up into more than 80 firms. To reduce these potential 
disadvantages policy makers may consider to increase the size of the average tendered 
business operation and to construct upstream markets that are less specialised – for 
example by merging different activities into one market. 
Some of those that oppose the idea of decreased transaction costs draw attention to the 
high asset specificity in the railway sector. They suggest that there is no such thing as an 
optimal way of organising competition in industries that have to rely on (monopoly) 
network facilities, and there is now a growing concern that the wrong design of the 
industry’s basic structural framework may have been chosen in the early days of the 
European regulatory reforms (Hultkrantz et al, 2005). One possible source for 
increasing transaction costs that may be more important than gains from competition is 
the misalignment of the mode of organisation. Misalignment refers to an arrangement in 
which the characteristics of the mode of organisation do not fit the attributes of the 
transaction it has to organise. This problem can occur in any new market constructed 
after the dismantling of a former monopoly. Yvrande-Billon and Ménard (2005) show 
that in the implementation of the privatization of British Rail, substantial discrepancies 
occurred between the length of the contracts awarded to the operators and the life-span 
and redeployability of the rolling stock owned and managed by the rolling stock owners 
(ROSCOs). This created huge differences in leasing costs between operators, with 
operators using lower redeployability equipment having to pay significant risk 
premiums compared to operators using more standardised equipment. Yvrande-Billon 
and Ménard (2005) claim that in order to deal with the misalignment resulting from the 
constraints imposed on them, parties involved in the transactions adopted a strategy 
oriented towards reducing the specificity of assets involved. Substantial changes in the 
design and construction of rolling stock were introduced aiming at increased 
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standardization. In doing so, the partners intended to reduce their interdependence, 
circumventing the problem generated by the mode of organization imposed on them. 
Organizing the Deregulated Competitive Railway Markets 
The deregulated European passenger railway markets have typically involved the 
introduction of public procurement of railway services by means of competitive 
tendering, also known as a franchise bidding framework (as originally developed by 
Chadwick in the 1850s, followed by Demsetz (1968), as an alternative to regulation of 
natural monopolies). For example, this was the case with the British deregulation in 
1993-94 and the Swedish deregulation starting in 1989. However, Britain and Sweden 
used competitive tenders to select an operator in radically different ways 
(Alexandersson and Hultén, 2006b). In the British case, operators competed to win the 
right to operate a whole network using a net cost contract. In the Swedish case, 
operators competed either to run a network under a gross cost contract or to run a single 
or a only a few railway lines under a net cost contract.  
In a competitive tender, a firm or a consortium makes promises about supplying a 
service at a defined quality level in return for either a subsidy or against payment. This 
procedure shows a strong resemblance to performing common value auctions with a 
sealed-bid procedure. However, the price of the bidders may not be the only factor 
(although often the most important) to take into account. The procuring public authority 
typically evaluates the competing bids regarding both price and quality once the bidding 
process has ended. Hence, competitive tenders combine traits, advantages, 
disadvantages and risks, of both auctions and beauty contests.  
Hultkrantz and Nilsson (2001) claim that a pure auction is better than a beauty contest 
because it offers a more market-oriented, objective and transparent method for awarding 
licences. Their strongest argument in favour of auctions is that firms in the auction 
process, by means of offering more and more money, reveal information about their 
estimation of the value of the good. Hultkrantz and Nilsson (2001) point out several 
disadvantages with beauty contests: 1) the process is slow and cumbersome, in 
particular if the final decision is challenged in court, 2) it is difficult to achieve 
transparency, and 3) many criteria are not objective or difficult to quantify. They further 
suggest that, even when social concerns are important, an auction is a better alternative 
since it can also include minimum requirements and can allow both positive bids in 
attractive regions and negative bids in unattractive regions. 
Auctions also present notable risks and potential disadvantages.3
                                                 
3 This paragraph draws from Alexandersson and Hultén (2006a) 
 In many auctions, as 
well as in many competitive tenders, firms have made unrealistically optimistic 
forecasts about future revenues and costs. In auction theory, the concept of winner’s 
curse is used to explain why winning bids may be based upon judgmental failures. In 
particular, common value auctions – in which the participating bidders value items 
differently based upon their judgment of uncertain prospects – tend to be won by the 
bidder with the most optimistic estimate of the item’s value (see e.g. Kagel and Levin, 
1986). Adnett (1998) argues that a low number of bidders, and in particular if they are 
inexperienced as in the first round of tendering in a certain business, will increase the 
importance of winner’s curse in competitive tenders. An open English auction, in which 
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the bidders continuously follow the bids of their rivals, may on the one hand stimulate 
aggressive bidding and decrease the risk of too optimistic bids and the related winner’s 
curse (Milgrom and Weber 1982), but may on the other hand increase risk of collusion 
(see e.g. Robinson 1985). 
In the coming years we will see two new types of competition in the European railway 
market. The first new type of competition is competition on-the-track on international 
lines based on the cabotage principle. This will make it possible for operators running 
railway lines between at least two EU member states to pick up passengers at every stop 
along the line, including stops in the foreign countries without having to sign 
agreements with local operators. The Thalys system that connects Paris, Brussels, 
Cologne, and Amsterdam has been functioning a bit like this, but only in accordance to 
an agreement signed by the four countries on how to share the revenue. The second new 
type of competition is competition on-the-track between operators in a national market. 
Used already to a limited extent in Great Britain, the regulatory framework for this kind 
of competition is currently being drawn up in Sweden. These two market types are quite 
different from the auction model or the beauty contest model. They resemble more 
normal competitive markets in the transportation industries, for example the airline 
market or the long-distance bus market. 
The four different market structures that have been used or are planned to be used in the 
European market rest on different perceptions on how to optimise the functioning of a 
railway network (table 1). The competition on-the-track model emphasizes the benefits 
having competition as a driver for increased efficiency and meeting the demands of 
passengers. However, it assumes that network externalities and scale economies are 
becoming less important in the increasingly Europeanised and deregulated railway 
market. The advocates of the monopoly model argue that the railway continues to be a 
natural monopoly industry due to economies of scale and scope and network 
externalities. The competition for-the-track models lean towards the assumption that 
competitive tenders can combine the benefits of competition and allow operators to 
exploit economies of scale and coordinate the services in a long-term perspective. The 
competition on-the-track model has hitherto not been put to test in any modern 
European market. In many markets there are overlaps and what can be labelled 
“accidental competition” between inter-regional and regional operators charging 
different prices for trains running on the same track. The British bus deregulation of the 
mid 1980s resembles to a certain extent the on-the-track model currently being planned 
in Sweden. Several studies showed that the British bus market lost more due to lack of 
coordination between bus operators than it benefitted from competing companies 
offering a more customer-oriented product (see for example Mackie, Preston and Nash, 
1995, for a review). On the other hand, studies of the deregulation of long-distance bus 
services and European air travel have found less negative and more positive effects (see 
for example Bergman, 2002). 
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Table 1: Underlying assumptions on the relative importance of coordination and 
flexibility in the deregulated European railway markets 
 Private monopoly Sweden (1988-
2009) 
Great Britain Sweden (2010-) 
Market 
orientation and 
flexibility of 
operations 
Moderately high Moderately high 
in monopoly 
network, relatively 
low in CPTA 
market 
Moderately high High 
Economies of 
scale 
High High in monopoly 
network, lower in 
all other networks 
Relatively high Low 
Time table 
planning 
In the hands of 
monopolist 
In the hands of 
public agencies: 
CPTA or 
Banverket 
In the hands of the 
operator 
Market driven 
Network 
externalities 
Very high High Moderately high Not important 
 
SLOW HISTORY: THE SWEDISH DEREGULATION PROCESS 1988-2008 
There is an important pre-history of Swedish railway reforms beginning already in the 
1960s, but the Transport Policy Act of 1988, with its ground-breaking split of railway 
infrastructure from operations, is commonly considered the starting point for the 
transformation of the Swedish railway system – from a vertically and horizontally 
integrated monopoly to a market characterized by decentralization and intra-modal 
competition. 
The Transport Policy Act of 1988 had the objective to make the conditions for the 
railways more similar to those for the roads. The state took the full responsibility for 
railway infrastructure investments and maintenance by means of a new authority – 
Banverket, while SJ would transform into a train operating company, paying charges for 
using the tracks (based upon marginal costs for maintenance). Prior to separation, SJ 
suffered from trying to perform services on a network that was under-capitalized. Once 
a line started to make losses, infrastructure investments typically came to a halt. For the 
state, it was difficult to grant more money to SJ, partly because it could be seen as 
unfair from the view of other transportation companies, and partly because it was 
difficult to monitor how SJ actually spent the money. Setting up the national authority 
Banverket made it easier to increase public spending on the railways, since all the 
money was channelled to a national authority rather than to a specific operator in the 
transportation industry. The split included an agreement implying that the state 
committed itself to spending at least 1 billion SEK per year on infrastructure 
investments while SJ would concentrate on becoming an efficient railway operator. 
Infrastructure investments were to be evaluated by means of socio-economic 
calculations. Among its several other components, the Act also marked a general policy 
step in the direction of extending the responsibility of the County Public Transport 
Authorities (CPTAs) – established in 1979 to coordinate regional public bus services – 
into the unprofitable regional railway services, inspired by some early cases where this 
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had been tried. In return, the CPTAs were compensated by state subsidies equalling SJ’s 
operating deficits on these lines, and the rolling stock was also transferred to the 
CPTAs. 
A deregulation of the railways in terms of increased intra-modal competition was not 
explicitly mentioned in the Act. Nevertheless, the vertical separation of infrastructure 
from operations, combined with the decentralized responsibility for regional railway 
services to regional authorities (along with the necessary money and rolling stock), 
made public procurement by competitive tendering of these lines possible. Some 
CPTAs had already tried tendering procedures for their bus services, as a result of 
previous reforms in that sector. This made it natural to use competitive tendering also of 
regional railway lines. The result of this policy change was the entry of competitors to 
SJ starting with BK Tåg in 1990, becoming the first entrant for more than 40 years. 
In the beginning of 1991, the Ministry of Transport expressed the view that more 
operators would stimulate the railway industry to make use of its resources in a more 
efficient way. At the time, there was a perceived fear among many politicians that SJ’s 
power on the transportation market could become too strong, especially since SJ’s 
management had been unwilling to concentrate on the railway services, keeping SJ a 
much diversified transportation conglomerate. After a shift in power in Parliament in 
September the same year, a new centre-right-wing government declared its objective to 
open the railways to more competition. The first step was to subject more railway traffic 
to tendering. When SJ got rid of the responsibility for track infrastructure, it had been 
directed only to perform profitable train services under its own account. While large 
parts of the unprofitable services were run on the regional lines and therefore under the 
responsibility of the CPTAs, many services of the inter-regional main line network were 
also unprofitable. Since 1988, the state had been procuring these services by means of 
annual negotiations with SJ, instead of simply transferring subsidies to SJ every year to 
cover the deficits. In 1992, building on the experiences of regional services, a regulatory 
change made it possible for the state’s negotiator to use competitive tendering for 
subsidized inter-regional services from 1993. While the local tenders were for gross-
cost contracts, i.e. the operator got no revenues from ticket sales, the tenders of inter-
regional services presupposed net cost contracts. The bidding firm has to project both 
the costs and the revenues from fares during the contract period and generally has more 
freedom to influence the services than under a gross-cost contract. Moreover, in order to 
get access to several common functions and to necessary rolling stock, the new 
operators bidding for these contracts had to reach an agreement with the former 
monopolist, SJ. For several years, these tenders involved much negotiation and 
whenever competitors appeared, SJ commonly reduced its own bid during this process 
in order to keep other operators from entering the market. It took until 1999 before other 
firms than SJ were able to win a contract. By that time, several of the railways’ common 
functions had been removed from SJ and a proper price-list of vehicles had been 
established by the procuring authority and the government. 
In 1993-94 several reports looking into the feasibility of deregulating the whole network 
followed, coupled with a fierce political debate. In May 1994, a bill on a far-reaching 
deregulation was passed in Parliament, despite strong opposition from the Social 
Democrats, the left-wing party and the railway unions. Unsurprisingly, when the Social 
Democrats regained power in Parliament through the election in September the same 
year, the deregulation of the railways was quickly postponed. 
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A less radical reform came into effect in July 1996. The functions of allocation of track 
capacity and train traffic control were transferred from SJ to Banverket, while other 
common facilities were to be available for other train operators under commercial but 
non-discriminating terms. The Train Traffic Control unit within Banverket monitors has 
come to monitor all train movements on the Swedish railway network. All the wishes of 
the operators are coordinated with the objective to find solutions that meet these wishes 
in the best possible and non-discriminatory way. Due to track capacity constraints on a 
large part of the network, Banverket actually allocates planned delays compared to the 
shortest possible time needed for a particular transportation. The end result of this 
process is the granting of certain timetable positions (“slots”) to each operator, and the 
production of a corresponding national timetable. The CPTAs’ rights were extended, 
making it easier for them to replace reductions in SJ’s supply of inter-regional trains 
with regional CPTA-managed services and further increasing the practice of 
competitive tendering. In these years investments in the infrastructure increased 
significantly. During the recession years 1993-94, a political decision was made on 
increasing public spending on infrastructure investments to about 3 billion SEK per 
year. The real investment figures became substantially higher and reached nearly 10 
billion SEK in 1995. 
A new Transport Policy Bill was passed in 1998. In an effort to achieve more equal 
terms for competing modes of transportation, in particular concerning freight, the track 
access fees were lowered. In order to make entry easier for freight operators competing 
with SJ, some fringe railway lines that had remained in SJ’s hands were transferred to 
Banverket. Moreover, a new national authority, Rikstrafiken, was established. The 
authority took over the tasks of the former state’s negotiator, becoming responsible for 
competitive tendering of unprofitable inter-regional services (including all modes of 
public transportation), aiming also at better co-ordination with the CPTA-tendered 
services. The basic model of competition used by Rikstrafiken is competition “for the 
tracks”. Once a contract has been won in a tender, the winning firm becomes the sole 
provider of the specified services during the contract period. 
The CPTAs further increased their role in the railway market by buying new rolling 
stock or taking over the ownership of former state owned rolling stock. In 1999 a group 
of CPTAs became owners of Transitio a rolling stock company created by Adtranz in 
Sweden. 
Following the inflow of new operators in 2000, a new Bill had the objective to facilitate 
for SJ to compete under the new circumstances and to ensure equal access to functions 
and services for all operators. SJ’s organizational structure as a business administration 
was therefore replaced in 2001 by several state-owned companies concentrating on 
specified parts of the railway businesses. The passenger division formed one company 
(SJ Ltd), the freight division another (Green Cargo), and so on for real estate 
(Jernhusen), maintenance (EuroMaint and Swemaint) and other businesses. Two 
divisions, TraffiCare (cleaning services) and Unigrid (computer information systems), 
were fully privatized a few months later. The leasing contracts for the rolling stock were 
kept in Affärsverket SJ (ASJ), the remains of the business administration SJ. Gradually 
SJ Ltd has paid the leasing contracts and taken full ownership of the majority of the 
rolling stock. An important part of the rolling stock controlled by ASJ is leased out to 
the operators winning Rikstrafiken’s tenders. Consequently, ASJ in several respects 
functions as a rolling stock company. In 2007 EuroMaint and Swemaint were sold to 
private investors. Jernhusen, is still owned by the state, the company owns 150 railway 
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stations and is also the primary owner of buildings used for maintenance of rolling 
stock. 
The taking apart and privatization of SJ is summarized in Figure 1, also including some 
of the previous divestments and separations from the business administration SJ. The 
most important of the earlier divestments were the sale of ASG, Sweden’s biggest 
forwarding agent, in 1995, and Swebus, Sweden’s biggest bus operator, in 1996. The 
figure also shows the current situation regarding which organisations that are now 
privatised or still state-owned. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The separation of the business administration SJ 1988-2008 
 
After the Bill of 2000, the process of regulatory change in the Swedish railway sector 
slowed down during the next eight years. The Social Democrat government was 
unwilling to allow competitors to enter SJ Ltd’s profitable lines. In 2003, the state had 
to intervene by means of transferring a substantial amount of money (1.8 billion SEK) 
to SJ Ltd from other state-owned companies in order to avoid bankruptcy and increased 
its borrowing rights at Riksgälden from 1 to 2 billion SEK. It had then become clear that 
the breaking-up of SJ into several separate companies had been an under-financed 
reform, but also that several of SJ’s contracts for regional and inter-regional passenger 
services were highly unprofitable due to the fact that SJ had won the tendered contracts 
with too low bids (Proposition (2002/03:86). 
The reforms in the following years focused on modernizing laws and regulations to 
achieve a regulatory framework in line with European Union directives. Following the 
European Commission’s first railway package, in 2004 a new Railway Act (2004:519) 
and Railway Regulation (2004:526), which regulate the access to the state’s railway 
infrastructure and the right to run railway services. A new Swedish Rail Agency was 
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established formed out of the old Railway Inspectorate. The authority has taken over the 
tasks concerning safety in the railway, underground and tram systems. It has also been 
assigned new tasks, such as monitoring that the fees charged for the utilization of the 
railway infrastructure are determined in a competition-neutral and non-discriminatory 
manner. The same goes for capacity allocation and provision of services. Any operator 
wishing to operate train services on the Swedish rail network needs to apply for a 
license from the Rail Agency. 
In 2007 SJ Ltd lost its monopoly on night trains and on charter trains. These changes 
constituted a first step towards new competition on the track based on market principles 
without subsidies. In 2008, the counties in southern Sweden got the permission to 
operate trains across the county barriers. 
Currently, eight passenger railway companies use the Swedish state’s rail infrastructure, 
the state-owned company SJ Ltd is still the dominant operator (table 2). 
Table 2: Turnover for the most important railway passenger operators in the Swedish 
market 2001-2006 
Company Turnover per annum (million SEK) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
SJ Ltd (excl Stockholmståg) 5546 5711 5524 5241 5690 6233 
A-train 315 341 359 402 441 469 
Connex/Veolia 134 134 215 387 387 388 
Tågkompaniet 378 399 242 154 225 246 
Roslagståg   163 168 176 187 
BK Tåg 177 165 177    
Citypendeln/Keolis 921 1027 1069 1077 1126 564* 
Stockholmståg      705* 
Merresor   8 26 121 164 
Total 7471 7777 7757 7355 8166 8956 
*6 months operations 
The transportation volumes (in terms of passenger kilometres) have increased by more 
than 40% between 1990 and 2003. Looking closer at the development since 1995, it is 
clear that no other mode has experienced a stronger growth in terms of passenger 
kilometres. Behind an increase of 32%, we find that the growth in short-distance 
regional transportation has been particularly strong (up more than 70%), while long-
distance travelling (more than 100 km) increased by 15% (SIKA, 2005). During the 
whole deregulation period 1988-2007 we have seen an increase from 6.5 billion to 10.3 
billion passenger railway kilometres, (Alexandersson and Hultén, 2009). 
This impressive development has certainly come at a cost, as the Swedish state’s net 
costs for the railway sector increased from 2.4 billion SEK in 1988 to 16.6 billion SEK 
in 2008 (in current prices). This (somewhat preliminary) cost calculation includes all 
payments from the state to the railway sector and all revenues from the railway sector to 
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the state (except taxes). Included in the revenues and payments are the annual losses or 
profits of SJ and the related state-owned companies (figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Cash flow between the Swedish state and the railway sector1988-2008 
(current prices) 
Summary of the process 1988-2008 
When the deregulation process started the politicians intended that SJ should become a 
profitable railway operator if the state took responsibility for the infrastructure. 20 years 
later the initial calculation that an annual cash injection of 1 billion SEK should be 
enough to get a sustainable railway system has proven to be much too optimistic. The 
costs have spiralled and the involvement of the state and the political system continues 
to be on the increase. Instead of a monopoly operator handling the state’s interests in the 
railway sector, the state and regional political institutions manage an increasingly 
complex system, which has also come be affected by increasingly ambitious goals. 
As should be apparent from our case story, the state continues to be a very important 
actor in the Swedish railway sector and has a number of roles related to railway and 
transportation policy issues. The state is the owner of SJ Ltd, ASJ, Green Cargo, 
Jernhusen, and other companies, with all the responsibilities following from ownership. 
The state is also responsible for investments and maintenance in railway infrastructure 
through Banverket and for auditing, safety and regulatory issues through the Rail 
Agency. The role as owner also has to be combined with the role as the entity 
responsible for setting up the basic conditions for competition and operating firms in 
society, in this case the rules of the game in the railway market. In addition to this 
comes the role of forming the long-term national transport policy. 
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FAST HISTORY: THE RADICAL REFORMS OF 2009 AND 2010 
The deregulated railway system that has evolved from 1988 to 2008 regarding the 
Swedish passenger services has increasingly become questioned by several actors in the 
market and by politicians in power. The widespread use of gross cost contracts are 
assumed to erode profitability of the industry, due to a too strong focus on the cost side 
and a race to the lowest price the companies are prepared to offer. In some cases this 
cost focus may even provide a disincentive to increase patronage, since more passengers 
may lead to increased costs, for example for cleaning and collecting ticket payments. 
Net cost contracts dominate in the procured long-distance passenger rail services. They 
give the operators a higher degree of freedom in running the railway services and give 
more leverage in balancing costs relative to revenue. The CPTAs and Rikstrafiken have 
often been criticized to lack sufficient competence as procurers, which can explain 
questionable outcomes in some tenders and even post-tender renegotiations. In some 
cases big firms seem to have undermined the system by means of placing strategically 
low bids in order to force smaller competitors to leave the market. Sometimes, 
miscalculated bids have won tenders only to incur serious problems for the winning 
operator. Firms that have lost competitive tenders have on numerous occasions claimed 
that winning firms either cross-subsidize from more profitable contracts or – in the case 
of state-owned firms – use public subsidies to win contracts. A general problem today is 
that almost all tenders are challenged in court by one or several of the losing bidders. 
This adds cost to the whole procurement process and may delay the start of new traffic 
contracts. The CPTAs have sometimes expressed their discontent over the limited 
possibilities to weigh in on “soft” factors in the selection of the winning bid, as well as 
the difficulties to renew the contract-period with a company that has served well but 
may not have presented the lowest bid. Towards the end of a contract period the staff of 
a company running a certain service may experience a lack of job security (since they 
do not know if their company will continue its services), affecting their commitment to 
the job. 
These problems and increasing subsidy levels for public transportation in general 
combined with the current right-centre Government’s strong belief in market 
liberalisation has opened up for a radical regulatory change of nearly all parts of public 
transport. Two Government committees, one for public transport in general and one for 
the passenger railway sector, have presented their proposals in 2008-2009. 
The report (SOU 2009:39) from the Government committee investigating the whole 
whole public transport sector proposes changes in terms of market entry that will affect 
railway services but also (and not least) local and regional bus traffic, aviation and 
maritime traffic. The head of the committee suggests (in a so-called traffic declaration 
model) that public transport supply plans shall be drawn up and revised once a year by 
transport authorities, inviting private transport operators to suggest what kind of traffic 
they are willing to run under commercial terms. Traffic not offered commercially, but 
still believed to be necessary, will be tendered. The dead of the committee also thinks 
that the traffic authorities of today (often performing their responsibilities through 
limited companies) need to be reshaped into new regional public bodies (Lundin, 2009). 
When the current model of provision and procurement of public transport services (for 
both bus and rail and other modes) is replaced, the committee believes that the new 
system should be adapted to the forthcoming regulatory framework as decided in the 
EU, i.e. the regulation 1370/2007 on public transport by rail and road, which will get 
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legal status in Sweden towards the end of 2009. This will primarily have consequences 
for how contracts are agreed upon and what type of contracts to use for the part of 
traffic where public procurement and subsidies are needed. The EU regulation presents 
three options for public transport authorities when it comes to the provision of public 
transport services (Van de Velde, 2005). 
1. Providing them by themselves on their own account 
2. Direct award to a subsidiary company, or 
3. A competitive tendering procedure 
 
The head of the committee believes that it is by means of a competitive tendering 
procedure that society should secure its complementing traffic needs, which is to be 
defined in a traffic plan and be run in accordance to a public transport obligation. After 
the tender, the responsible authority will award the winning transport operators 
contracts to perform public transport services by means of service concessions (i.e. not 
service contracts). These concessions may imply an exclusive right to run traffic along 
certain lines. With the new EU regulation, the use of concessions is regulated and 
thereby this will provide guidance for the new procurement system. The regulation says 
that the competitive tendering procedure should be open for all companies, be fair and 
follow the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, but is also granting traffic 
authorities flexibility on how to perform the tenders. The regulation does not include 
any list of criteria to be fulfilled for the authorities when awarding the contracts on 
public transport services. 
While the aforementioned proposals (which have yet to translate into any official 
Government bill) is covering the whole public transport market and in particular the 
interface between commercial and subsidised services, the regulatory reforms regarding 
commercial train services have progressed further. By means of a government 
committee proposal from the fall of 2008 (SOU 2008:92), and a related Government bill 
in the spring of 2009 (Proposition 2008/09:176), the remaining SJ monopoly on long-
distance passenger services will be abolished step-by-step, starting with journeys 
offered during weekends (Friday-Sunday) already in July 2009 (provided that ad-hoc 
capacity is available). In addition, limitations may be introduced for the CPTAs’ 
abilities to steer what kind of traffic to run in each county, as the idea is to have 
commercial actors getting increased freedom to run railway services. Only services 
unable to run on a commercial basis, but believed to be truly necessary to keep, will be 
tendered. These proposals may be seen as an adaptation of all domestic passenger 
services by rail to the commitment of Sweden to open up the market for international 
passenger services by 2010 in accordance to the so-called market-opening directive 
(2007/58/EC) following from the third railway package. The ultimate goal of the 
Swedish proposals for the passenger railway market is to create a general system with 
competition on the track, where operators may be free to enter and exit the market much 
like in any other competitive market. Consequently, all operators willing to run trains 
commercially on the Swedish railway network will have the opportunity to do so – as 
long as capacity is not a constraint. However, track charges will vary according to e.g. 
how attractive a certain departure time is for potential operators. In order to break ties 
when firms apply for the same slots, comparisons of their respective “socio-economic 
efficiency” will be applied, at least until a proper auctioning system is implemented. 
Taking timetable planning into account, the market would in practice not be completely 
opened before the end of 2012. It remains unclear to what extent entrants will be 
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allowed to compete on the Arlanda Airport line (private monopoly) and on lines and 
networks were operators are running services under net-cost contracts. 
The shift from the present system (early 2009) consisting of a mix of procured railway 
services on unprofitable lines and a monopoly on profitable lines to the envisaged 
system with competition on the track requires that two parallel processes are completed 
successfully. The first process described above simply consists of allowing firms to 
compete on increasing parts of the network. The second process covers the 
reconfiguration of all the supporting activities required for competition on the track. 
We saw in the case history of the Swedish deregulation from 1988-2008 how the 
legislators have moved resources, competencies and property rights from SJ to other 
actors in the market. Despite of these conscious efforts a lot of work remains to be done 
to have a competitive market.  
One of the biggest remaining issue is access to rolling stock. SJ Ltd owns a big fleet of 
modern train sets designed for the Swedish railway network. In addition, the CPTAs 
directly or indirectly through their rolling stock company Transitio also own modern 
train sets that can be used in interregional railway services. However, these train sets 
can only be used during weekends, when the CPTAs operate fewer trains than on 
weekdays (Hellsvik, 2009). It is probable that access to competitive rolling stock will 
make it difficult for start-ups and other entrants to compete with SJ Ltd on equal terms. 
One possibility to provide access to rolling-stock on equal terms would be to transfer 
the ownership and liabilities of the remaining parts of SJ Ltd’s rolling stock to the state-
owned rolling stock company ASJ. This entity today owns most of the rolling stock 
used in the railway passenger services procured by Rikstrafiken, some discarded 
railway coaches from SJ Ltd as well as a substantial amount of rolling stock used in 
freight operations. The draw-backs with this solution are that SJ Ltd will lose control of 
one of its most valuable assets and that the state will directly control an even bigger part 
of the railway market. 
Another major issue is the booking and ticketing systems. The market leader today is 
Petra, owned by SJ Ltd, and the question is if Petra should become the standard in the 
deregulated market and made available to all other operators, or if the operators will 
have the right to use the booking and ticketing system they consider meet their 
requirements. If Petra becomes the only standard it will restrict the actions of the 
competitors in the future market. If Petra continues to be a proprietary standard of SJ it 
will give the operator a strong bargaining position against operators that are unwilling to 
develop their own booking and ticketing system. It is foreseen that this problem will be 
treated in a future Government bill. One related problem is the interconnected nature of 
the time-tables of all Sweden’s public transport systems. This system was created to 
make it easier for passengers to travel from one place in Sweden to another with a 
minimum waiting time when moving from for example one transport mode to another 
or from one railway line to another railway line. If a “national time-table” is supposed 
to function as before it will severely restrict the freedom of action of the actors in the 
passenger railway market. 
A third issue is the maintenance of the rolling stock. When the business administration 
SJ was dismantled, most of the buildings used for maintenance of rolling stock was 
handed over to the state-owned company Jernhusen. This company has now become a 
near monopolist in the market for these kinds of buildings. Maintenance firms and 
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operators that want to service and repair rolling stock are more or less forced to use 
Jernhusen’s buildings. This issue was discussed in the Government’s rail investigation 
committee in 2008 (SOU 2008:92) and is currently being evaluated by the Ministry of 
Enterprise, Energy and Communications. 
A fourth critical issue is how to allocate time slots to interested operators. It is 
envisaged that administrative coordination will continue to play a role but that 
economic principles will be allowed to play a more important role in the future. It is not 
yet decided how the time-table slots will be allocated using economic selection 
methods. As mentioned above, evaluations of socio-economic efficiency will play an 
important role in the beginning of the market opening process, but later on it is foreseen 
that monetary concerns will dominate, for example by means of auctions. The 
underlying assumption for a widespread use of auctions is a belief that market actors 
will behave intelligently once they get control over valuable time-table slots and fully 
utilise these assets. Consequently, this will translate into improved socio-economic 
efficiency. Most significantly, the National Rail Administration would like to see a 
more efficient use of time-table slots in peak hours.  
Table 3 below summarizes the goals of the reforms and the fundamental changes that 
took place in the railway industry from 1988-2009. 
Table 3: The Goals of the Reforms and Institutional Changes 1988-2009 
 1988 1994 2009 
Important 
institutions and 
regulatory bodies 
Banverket , CPTA, SJ Banverket, CPTAs, 
Railway Inspectorate 
Banverket, CPTAs, 
Rikstrafiken, Railway 
Agency  
Responsibility for 
the common 
functions 
SJ To be provided by SJ at 
prices equivalent to 
internal costs 
To be provided by 
Banverket or by firms 
operating in markets  
Providers of 
rolling stock 
SJ CPTA, and at market 
prices by SJ 
CPTAs, rolling stock 
companies, Rikstrafiken 
and railway operators 
Responsibility for 
time tables and 
other logistics 
SJ SJ manages the train 
control function 
Banverket 
Goal of the 
reforms 
SJ to become 
profitable 
Competitors to enter in 
niche markets. SJ to 
become more efficient 
Complete deregulation, 
industry efficiency 
EU deregulation Not started Directive on the (account) 
separation of 
infrastructure from 
railway operations 
Deregulated freight traffic 
from 2007 
Opening of competition 
on international passenger 
lines from 2010 (incl 
cabotage) 
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ANALYSIS: THE TRANSITION FROM A MULTITUDE OF MARKET 
STRUCTURES TO A MORE UNIFIED MARKET 
The present partially deregulated Swedish railway passenger market is constituted by 
many different types of markets – from monopolies on commercially attractive lines 
and networks to competitive tenders for the track for loss-making lines using either 
gross cost or net cost contracts and competition on the track of commercial lines. This 
system is now intended to be reshaped into a more unified model with market actors 
competing to operate commercially attractive slot times, lines and networks, 
complemented by competitive tendering of all the railway operations deemed un-
profitable by market actors but socio-economically valuable by society (table 4). 
Table 4: Regulatory structure of the Swedish railway sector in 1988, 2008 and the 
projected structure after new legislation 
Part of market 1988 2008 2010-2012 
Regional (non-
profitable) 
SJ holds monopoly and 
receives subsidies 
Procurement of gross 
cost contract by 
competitive tendering 
(competition for the 
tracks) 
Procurement of net cost 
contracts by competitive 
tendering (competition for 
the tracks) 
Regional 
(profitable) 
SJ holds monopolies A-train has a monopoly 
on the Arlanda line. SJ 
has a monopoly contract 
in the Mälardalen region 
Competition on the tracks 
Inter-regional 
(non-profitable) 
SJ holds monopoly and 
receives subsidies 
Procurement of net cost 
contracts by competitive 
tendering (competition 
for the tracks) 
Procurement by 
competitive tendering 
(competition for the 
tracks) 
Inter-regional 
(profitable) 
SJ holds monopoly SJ holds monopoly Competition on the tracks 
 
There are a multitude of options to open up SJ Ltd’s remaining monopoly rights to 
provide inter-regional passenger railway services. Three broad solutions are feasible: 1) 
the monopoly rights are in fact property rights held by SJ Ltd; 2) all lines, profitable and 
unprofitable, will be tendered and the best bid gives a monopoly to the winning firm; 
and 3) all time-table slots on all railway lines are auctioned to competitors in the 
market. If the monopoly rights are considered to be property rights held by SJ, then the 
Government must ask the former monopolist to divest these rights in return for 
compensation. In this scenario it is probable that SJ will have a say in how the 
monopoly rights are distributed in the market. However, it is very likely that the 
Swedish Government will take the position that SJ Ltd has no such property rights.4
                                                 
4 The Government (SOU 2008:92, p. 327) put it succinctly in the committee directives: “The point of departure is that 
SJ Ltd’s exclusive right to operate on railway lines is abolished” (our translation) 
  In 
such a case the Swedish Government can choose between a set of different deregulation 
options. If the Government prefers to continue along the lines of competitive tenders it 
can choose a competitive franchising procedure similar to the British deregulation. 
Firms will then make bids for networks, lines or slot times. The bids may contain cash 
payments and quality aspects or quality aspects only. Such a tendering procedure could 
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be administrated by Rikstrafiken, now having a solid experience handling competitive 
tenders. The third possibility is that the Government organises auctions of all the time 
slots in the whole railway network. Firms can then make bids on the lines they are 
interested in and make commitments on the quality, number and length of trains they 
intend to use if their bid wins. The third possibility currently seems to be the preferred 
long-term solution, but comes with a catch: firms may have to repeatedly apply every 
year (or even more often) where they want to run commercial services, since this would 
be closest to a model of true on-the-track competition. 
Regardless of the solution that is selected, this process of making the most of the market 
has to be complemented by a new wave of competitive tenders for all remaining 
networks, lines or time slots that are considered socio-economically important but 
regarded as non-profitable by the railway operators. 
Before the first round of the market selection process it is important to define a model 
and criteria to allocate capacity and enforce an efficient operation of the entire railway 
network to avoid the creation of bottlenecks. The Swedish railway network is 
increasingly marred by capacity problems on many lines, in particular during rush hours 
in the vicinity of the bigger cities. Lessons from Great Britain have shown that 
competitors using the same track may lead to sub-optimisation of the use of the railway 
line by operating too short trains, which will create bottlenecks and quality problems for 
the passengers (Nash and Matthews, 2003). The Swedish railway network has 
experienced similar problems when the traffic control has been forced to use 
administrative routines to decide if a high speed train or a regional train has priority on 
a line with limited capacity. 
The transition from the old fragmented system to the new unified system clearly 
presents many obstacles and stumbling-blocks. A first problem is timing. A large 
number of contracts will not expire for many years to come. This will make it difficult 
to organise the new selection model in a comprehensive way, because many contracts 
effectively give monopoly rights to the contracted operator. If these monopoly rights are 
infringed, a contract holders may demand compensation or make the contract null and 
void if he makes losses on the contract. Timing in terms of the business cycle may also 
determine if the planned deregulation will be successful or not. If the demand for 
railway passenger travel slows down as an effect of the current recession, it will create 
significant problems for all operators in the deregulated railway market. A second 
problem is misalignment, an arrangement in which the characteristics of the mode of 
organisation (time span of contacts) do not fit the attributes of the transaction it 
organises (time span and costs of commitments). All future contracts can be expected to 
be renegotiated every year or after a few years, but the commitments of the entrants will 
be much longer. This will make it difficult for entrants to compete on equal terms with 
the incumbents – most importantly SJ Ltd – because entry and exit will be costly. The 
Government committee as well as the Government itself are aware of this and have 
suggested that common necessary functions, for example ticket systems, are being made 
accessible on equal conditions. However, access to rolling stock will be a much more 
difficult problem to solve. In Great Britain the railway operators winning the contracts 
became monopolists for at least seven years and nevertheless problems occurred in the 
supply and pricing of rolling stock. Swedish rolling stock continues to follow Swedish 
national standards, although newer vehicles (X2, X40, X60 and Regina) may be easier 
to trade in second hand markets. Another option to provide operators with rolling stock 
on equal terms would be to create a true state-owned rolling stock company, for 
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example by transferring the ownership and liabilities of the remaining parts of SJ Ltd’s 
rolling stock to the state-owned company ASJ. However, there are many draw-backs 
with such a solution, for example that SJ Ltd would lose control of one of its most 
valuable assets, that the state would take charge over rolling stock development and that 
the state would directly control an even bigger part of the railway market. A third 
problem is the risk of strategic behaviour from oligopoly firms. This can take many 
forms, one extreme being firms promising to serve more destinations without subsidies 
than commercially feasible, and the other extreme being firms engaging in cherry 
picking, leaving the state and the regional transport authorities the cumbersome task of 
adding lines and departure times to get a viable railway network. The problem is that no 
one is in a position to know how firms will react in the new market context. The 
Government tends to argue that more rather than less railway connections will be 
operated commercially after the deregulation (SOU 2008:92, p. 329).  The Government 
committee considered it likely that the enhanced possibilities to operate commercially 
should stimulate the railway market actors to more entries and increased attention to 
running commercial services instead of operating railway services with gross or net cost 
contracts (SOU 2008:82, p. 309). A fourth problem is the risk of comparing and 
selecting among offers that are inherently difficult to compare. One of the key 
arguments for the new regulatory system – competition on the track – is that it will 
introduce more competition and market activities to the railway passenger market. But 
what may happen is that operators offer to serve markets in so dramatically different 
ways that it will demand much more competence from the procuring authorities than the 
current system of competitive tendering. This is due to the fact that in the system used at 
present it is the authority describes the services to be provided, while in the system 
envisaged for the future the operators (which may have very different characteristics) 
will describe the services they would like to operate. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Swedish passenger railway market seems set to take further steps towards 
deregulation in the near future. Railway operators will be given the right to compete 
directly on the tracks and hopefully this will lead to a higher level of service quality to 
the passengers at a lower cost for society. The belief is that competition in the market 
will provide a more efficient railway system than the historical model with monopoly 
rights held either by firms or public agencies. The new system will replace not only SJ 
Ltd’s nation-wide monopoly on the commercial long-distance lines but also the regional 
monopolies held by the CPTAs when railway operators deem commercially railway 
services viable. 
Let us conclude this paper by comparing the perceived disadvantages of the current 
system for procurement with the potential risks of the new competitive system (table 5).  
The procurement system of today is considered to be problematic and non-optimal for 
many reasons. The use of gross cost contracts erodes profitability of the industry, and 
may even provide disincentives to increase patronage if more passengers only lead to 
increased costs. Both the CPTAs and Rikstrafiken have received criticism for lacking 
competence as procurers. This questioning of the authority of the procuring agencies 
have led to post-tender renegotiations and that almost all tenders today are challenged in 
court by one or several of the losing bidders. The most critical issue is the weight given 
to price (the level of subsidy) in comparison to qualitative factors. The result is that it 
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takes more time to carry out tendering procedures and that the whole procurement 
process has become more expensive. A further problem is that many tenders see only a 
few competitors (in some cases only one bidder) which raise concerns for the efficiency 
of the market process. The appearance of too low bids has also created major problems 
for the procuring agencies and the passengers, when operators go bankrupt (BK Tåg and 
Sydvästen) or under-supply compared with the agreement in the contract. 
We have pointed out four problems with the envisaged new system, timing, 
misalignment, strategic behaviour and incomparable bids. Timing is a problem because 
a large number of contracts will not expire for many years to come and this will make it 
difficult to organise the new selection model in a comprehensive way. If attention is not 
paid to the monopoly rights of a contract holder, legal problems such as renegotiations 
of or reneging a contract can occur. Misalignment will probably become an issue 
because all future contracts will be renegotiated annually or after a few years, but the 
commitments of the railway operators will be much longer. This will make it difficult 
for entrants to compete on equal terms with the incumbents since entry and exit will be 
costly. Strategic behaviour from oligopoly firms can take many forms –  with firms 
promising to serve more without subsidies than commercially feasible or firms engaging 
in cherry picking. The fourth problem or risk is that operators offer to serve markets in 
so dramatically different ways that it will demand much more from the procuring 
authority than the current system with competitive tendering.  
Table 5: A comparison of the problems and opportunities in the current railway 
passenger system and the system envisaged for the future 
 Current system with parallel 
market structures of monopoly and 
various procurement models 
Envisaged system with a 
sequential selection process of on-
the-track competition followed by 
procurement 
Misalignment Entrants have been at a disadvantage 
in getting access to many functions 
such as rolling stock 
The contract length will be 
sometimes be so short that it will be 
extremely risky for an entrant to 
invest in new rolling stock 
Strategic behaviour Strategic bidding to win contracts 
from financially weaker competitors 
Risk of either too aggressive or too 
soft commitments 
Timing Early long-terms agreements (pre 
1988) between CPTAs and SJ have 
given SJ a strong bargaining position 
when the CPTA wanted to introduce 
competitive tendering 
Breaking of contracts not due to 
expire for many years will be 
costly. The down-turn in the 
business cycle may lead to 
economic problems for the 
operators 
Bid comparisons Increasing number of legal battles Will probably demand even more 
competent analysts and time-
consuming comparisons 
Market competition True competition has been nearly 
absent in many tenders, leaving the 
former monopolist SJ in a strong 
bargaining position 
Will hopefully be stronger than in 
the new system as Sweden becomes 
the one of the most deregulated 
markets in Europe 
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